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Abstract
In this paper I study how innovation investment in a software duopoly is a¤ected
by the fact that one of the rms is, or might become Open Source. Firms can either be
proprietary source (PS) or open source (OS) and have di¤erent initial technological levels.
An OS rm is a for prot organization whose basic software is OS and it is distributed for
free. The OS rm, however, is able to make prots from selling complementary software
and, on the cost side, it receives development help from a community of users. I rst
compare a duopoly composed by two PS rms with a mixed duopoly of a PS and OS rm
and I nd that a PS duopoly might generate more innovation than a mixed duopoly if the
initial technological gap between rms is small. However if this gap is large, a PS duopoly
generates less innovation than a mixed duopoly. I then extend the setting to allow PS rms
to switch to OS or to remain PS. A PS rm wants to become OS if it gets behind enough in
the technological race against a competitor. I nd that the outside option to become OS
might soften competition on innovation since the technological leader prefers to reduce
his innovation investment to avoid the OS switch of the follower. Therefore, although
the switch to OS could generate higher investment levels ex-post it might generate lower
investment ex-ante. In this context I nd that a government subsidy to OS rms could
be potentially harmful for innovation.
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comments on a early draft. I would also like to thank the participants of the 4th ICT Telecom Paris conference.
I gratefully acknowledge 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1 Introduction
An Integrated Development Environment or IDE is a software application that computer
programmers use along with a programming language to develop new software. It consists
of a set of tools such as a source code editor, a compiler and a debugger for which the IDE
provides a single and unied user interface1 . In 2001 an important event occurred in the IDE
software market: IBM donated a $40 million worth code to found the Eclipse Open Source
projecti. The origin of this code was VisualAgeii, a Proprietary Source IDE developed by
IBM that failed to retain market share against its main competitor, Microsoft Visual Studioiii.
The Open Source project was quite successful in gaining adoption and creating a community
that contributed to the development and improvement of the software. Although Eclipse is
distributed for free, IBM is still able to make prots from selling complementary goods such as
IBM Rational software: a set of development tools to "extend the Eclipse Platform"iv ,v ,vi. Due
to the project success, Eclipse was considered "the rst IDE to seriously challenge Microsofts
popular Visual Studio"vii ,viii. Moreover, the fact that the software is free, forced Microsoft
to provide Visual Studio Shell: a basic stripped-down free version of his IDE productix . The
VisualAge/Eclipse story shows how "dangerous" a dying Proprietary Source project could be
for a market leader if it turns into a successful Open Source project.
The IBM VisualAge/Eclipse story is an example of the increasing involvement of for prot
rms in Open Source (OS) as opposed to the community initiated and managed projects2 .
Like in our example the "sponsor" rm starts the OS project by releasing valuable internally
developed code and inviting a community of users to join and collaborate with the project by,
for example, solving code "bugs" or helping to develop new features. The fact that the code
is open usually implies that the "sponsor" rm looses the ability to make prots by charging
a price for the software license. However the rm can sell complementary software or services
such as additional tools, support and customization3 . Some of these "sponsored" projects,
like MySQL and JBoss, are born from scratch as OS. Others, like Eclipse or OpenO¢ ce, were
1 see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_development_environment
2 see West and OMahony (2005)
3Dahlander (2004) presents a detailed case study of how rms generate returns by selling a variety of
products and services related to OS software.
ihttp://news.cnet.com/IBM-makes-40-million-open-source-o¤er/2100-1001_3-275388.html
iihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eclipse_(software) iiihttp://www.informationweek.com/news/global-cio/show
Article.jhtml?articleID=23902341 ivhttp://www-306.ibm.com/software/rational/eclipse/
vhttp://www.technical-insight.com/my_samples/Eclipse the Competition with IBM Rational Tools.htm
vihttp://www.builderau.com.au/news/soa/IBM-gets-Rational-with-open-source/0,339028227,320277506,00.htm
viihttp://www.cmswire.com/cms/industry-news/the-coming-eclipse-of-visual-studio-000964.php
viiihttp://www.devsource.com/c/a/Languages/Eclipse-Behind-the-Name/ ixhttp://www.theserverside.net/news/
thread.tss?thread_id=45690
2
originally Proprietary Source (PS) software that became OS usually after they failed to retain
a signicant market share against a competitor. A PS software getting behind in an innovation
race against a competitor may nd catching up very costly and the help provided by a OS
community might reduce this cost.
Another interesting example comes from the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software
market. The ERP "is an integrated information system that serves all departments within an
enterprise"4 . Although some OS alternatives already exists, the market is mainly dominated
by two rms o¤ering PS software: SAP AG and Oraclex ,xi ,xii. SAP AG is the market leader,
with a share that is almost three times the share of Oracle. In a 2007 interviewxiii, SAPs chief
executive dismissed any Open Source threat to his company star product, despite the fact that
his main competitor had been moving aggressively into OS in other software areasxiv ,xv and
could potentially decide to do the same in the ERP market. He argues that programming ERP
software is unappealing and boring for OS developers since it implies, for example, dealing with
legal and accounting issues:"I have never seen anyone who likes doing that. That is not fun,
there is no choice. The boring bits are a strength of SAPs". In other words, the market leader
thinks his product is protected against the possibility of OS competition. He believes that,
as an OS rm, his competitor will not get signicant development help from the community
of users and therefore becoming OS will not be a protable decision. It is clear from this
example that the market leaders are aware of, and do take into consideration, their rivals
trade-o¤s from becoming OS. A natural question that arises is what would be the leaders
reaction if confronting a OS competitor becomes more likely.
The key question that emerges from both examples and that I address in this paper is
how the leaders behavior is a¤ected by the possibility of facing an OS rather than a PS
competitor. The leaders incentives to innovate, for example, will probably be a¤ected if
the follower becomes OS. For instance, if the OS project succeeds to develop a community
that helps to improve the software, then the leader will face a rival with a development cost
advantage. Moreover, the leaders revenue will get hurt since the OS software is usually
distributed for free and this will probably force the leader to lower its own price. Then it is
plausible to think that the market leader might prefer to modify his actions (i.e. slow down
the technological progress of his software) in order to avoid the OS switch of the follower. In
4 see http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/erp
xhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ERP_vendors xihttp://www.destinationcrm.com/Articles/
ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=47784 xiihttp://www.destinationcrm.com/Articles/CRM-News/
Daily-News/The-Dynamic-Duo-SAP-and-Oracle-Still-Lead,-But-Oracle-O¤ers-More-42857.aspx
xiiihttp://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid=5630C807-7CF1-4FDB-98FA-5063A87A4D33
xivhttp://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid=5630C807-7CF1-4FDB-98FA-5063A87A4D33
xvhttp://www.erpsoftware-news.com/2006/02/oracle_vs_sap_o.html
3
other words, the OS threat might soften competition in the market.
In this paper I study how innovation investment in a software duopoly is a¤ected by the
fact that one of the rms is, or might become, OS. In particular I focus on how the investment
of a PS market leader changes with the possibility of an OS switch by a PS follower. To this
end, I build a two stage duopoly model where in the rst stage rms invest in innovation
and in the second stage they compete in prices. At the beginning of the game, rms are
endowed with di¤erent initial levels of technology. There are two kind of consumers in the
market. One group just uses a basic software and the other group also needs some extra good
(additional tools, complementary software, support, etc.). In this context, an OS rm is a for
prot organization whose basic software is OS. The OS rm earns no income from selling basic
software licenses but is still able to have prots on the extra good. On the cost side, the OS
rm, receives development help from a community of users which reduces the rms innovation
costs. I st consider a basic setup where I compare the investment in a duopoly composed by
two PS rms versus one with a PS and an OS rm. Then I extend the basic setup to allow a
PS follower in the rst stage to choose between becoming OS or remaining PS. In this context
I analyze how the leaders investment incentives are a¤ected by this potential switch.
With this framework I get three main results. First, if the initial technological gap between
rms is small, a duopoly with two PS rms generates more innovation than a mixed duopoly of
an PS and OS rm. However if the initial technological gap is large then a duopoly with two PS
rms generate less innovation than a mixed duopoly. Second, in a context of a duopoly with two
PS rms, the outside option for the market follower to become OS might soften competition on
innovation. Therefore, although the switch to OS could generate higher investment levels ex-
post it might generate lower investment incentives ex-ante. Finally, in this simplied context,
I analyze the e¤ect of a government subsidy to OS rms and I nd that it might be potentially
harmful for innovation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves the
basic setup and compares a two PS rm duopoly with a mixed duopoly. Section 3 solves
the extended setup where the follower can choose between being OS or PS and analyses the
e¤ect of the OS "threat". Section 4 relates this paper with previous literature on this subject.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The following model adapts the framework of Sorenson (1995). Consider a horizontally dif-
ferentiated duopoly à la Hotelling where each rm sells two goods: a basic software s and a
complementary good t. Good t could be thought, for instance, as set of extra tools or support
and customization of the basic software s. I assume maximal di¤erentiation on the Hotelling
line: rm l; the leader, is located at 0 and rm f , the follower is located at 1. There is a unit
mass of consumers uniformly distributed on the line. Consumers are divided in two types:
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the rst group, of size  2 (0; 1); just needs the basic software s and does not require the
complementary good t: The second group, of size (1  ), needs to consume both software s
and good t together. Both types of consumers are evenly distributed in the line and only buy
one unit of the software s or one unit of the bundle s + t . To distinguish both groups of
consumers I speak of the s and s+ t markets.
The net utility of a consumer who only needs good s and is located at x 2 [0; 1] is given by
ux =
8><>:
s1l   x  psl if buys s from leader,
s1f   (1  x)  psf if buys s from follower,
0 if does not buy.
where s1l and s
1
f are the gross utilities derived from using the basic software and p
s
l and p
s
j are
their prices. Net utility also depends linearly on the disutility consumers su¤er from using a
software di¤erent from their ideal variant. Therefore x (or 1   x) represents the "distance"
between the consumers ideal variant and the one the leader (or follower) is o¤ering. Notice I
assume that the disutility per unit of distance is 1.
The net utility of a consumer who needs both s and t and is located at x 2 [0; 1] is given
by
ux =
8><>:
s1l   x  ps+tl if buys s+ t from leader,
s1f   (1  x)  ps+tf if buys s+ t from follower,
0 if does not buy.
Again s1l and s
1
f represent gross utilities and p
s+t
l and p
s+t
f are the prices for the set of
goods s+ t: For simplicity I assume that good t does not bring any extra gross utility and does
not increase the disutility per unit of distance5 .
I consider a basic and an extended setup. The basic setup consists in a two stage game
where, in the rst stage, rms invest in product innovation and in the second stage they
simultaneously choose prices and then users choose one of the product. At the beginning of
the game rms are endowed with initial levels of s0l and s
0
f dened as the pre "innovation"
gross utilities each rm can provide to consumers. I dene g0 = s0l   s0f as the pre-innovation
technological gap. I assume g0 > 0; there exists an initial technological advantage for the
leader and an initial technological disadvantage for the follower. This assumption is a shortcut
to the idea that rms were previously competing in the market with uneven development
success. Following this interpretation, rms invest in the rst stage of the game to increase
their demand from a new inow of customers arriving in the second stage.
Investment in innovation increases the gross utility that future users will derive from buying
their software. The post-innovation technological gap g1 = s1l   s1f could be higher or lower
5 If we assume that the good t increases the disutility per unit of distance then it increases the horizontal
di¤erentiation and the price each rm can charge for the bundle s+ t. This however will not change the main
results of the paper.
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than the initial g0 depending on rms relative investment expenditures. I assume a Stackelberg
framework for the rst stage: rm l; the leader, chooses investment rst. Following our
examples, I consider that the leader is always a PS rm while the follower can be either PS
or OS. A "PS duopoly" refers to a situation where both rms are PS and a "mixed duopoly"
refers to a situation in which the leader is PS and the follower is OS.
Investment costs di¤er depending on whether the rm is OS or PS. If the rm is PS (leader
or follower), to increase s0i to s
1
i = s
0
i + Ii costs
C(Ii) =
(Ii)
2
2
: (1)
On the other hand, as we have seen in the Eclipse example, the OS project can receive
development help from a community of user-developers. This development help is captured
in the model by assuming that it reduces innovation costs for the OS rm. Therefore, if the
follower is OS, to increase s0f to s
1
f = s
0
f + If costs
C(If ) =
(
0 if If  IH ;
(If IH)2
2 If > IH :
(2)
where IH is a positive constant that represents the development help provided by a community
of user-developers.
This cost formulation features the idea that community help reduces the marginal cost of
innovation for low values of If , however this help is limited so the reduction in marginal cost
converges to 0 as If increases. As we mentioned before, if rms were previously competing in
the market, this development help can be thought as coming from consumers that are using
preceding versions of the software. If the software code is open and distributed for free, users
of past versions of the software, along with future new customers, benet from the software
progress. The fact that IH is constant simplies the mathematics of the problem. An possible
alternative formulation is to assume that the level of help depends on the initial technological
gap g0. This is a shortcut to the idea that help is proportional to past levels of demand and
therefore on the past amount of users of the software. This alternative assumption does not
change our main results.
Since investing If < IH is costless, the OS follower invests If > IH as long as it is protable
to do so. Otherwise the minimum level of investment for the OS project is IH : Behind this
assumption is the idea that, if the OS follower exits the market and abandons the software
development, the community of user-developers invest IH anyway and the project will at least
progress IH6 :We could think that users of old versions always nd it protable to improve the
software for their own use, even if the OS follower exits the market and new customers will
only buy from the market leader.
6This assumption is not essential for the main results of the paper but simplies some computations. It will
only a¤ect the prot of the leader when it becomes a constrained monopolist. We could alternatively assume
that if the OS follower exits the market, all development of the project is abandoned.
6
In the second stage the two rms choose their prices simultaneously. At this point we nd
a second di¤erence between an OS and a PS rm. The OS rm is a for prot organization
whose basic software s is OS. The fact that the source code is open usually reduces the ability
to have revenue by directly charging a positive price for the software licence. Therefore, if the
rms is OS I assume that psf = 0: However, like in the VisualAge-Eclipse example, OS rms
can still earn prot on complementary PS software and services. I capture this by assuming
that the OS follower can still choose a positive ps+tf in the second stage
7 . Throughout the
analysis I assume that s1l and s
1
f are large enough that the market is covered.
While in the basic setup the OS or PS status of the follower is not decided by the rm,
in the extended setup this choice is allowed: in the rst stage, after observing the leaders
investment decision, a PS follower rst decides whether to remain PS or become OS and then
it chooses the level of investment If : If the PS follower chooses to become OS it forgoes income
in the basic software market (psf = 0) but gains development help IH from the user-developers
that reduces its innovation costs.
3 Analysis of the Basic Setup
In this section I analyze and compare the basic setup for both, a duopoly composed by two PS
rms and a mixed duopoly composed by a PS leader and a OS follower. I solve the game by
backward induction, obtaining rst the equilibrium prices of the second stage and then solving
the investment levels of the rst stage.
3.1 Stage two: market game
At stage two, the post-innovation technological gap g1 = s1l   s1f is given. For simplicity I
assume that the marginal cost of producing both s or t is 0:
3.1.1 PS duopoly
Since marginal costs are zero, when both rms are PS they face the following revenue maxi-
mization problems:
max
psl ;p
s+t
l
l = p
s
l


1 + psf   psl + g1
2

+ ps+t
l
"
(1  ) 1 + p
s+t
f   ps+tl + g1
2
#
: (3)
max
psf ;p
s+t
f
f = p
s
f


1 + psl   psf   g1
2

+ ps+tf
"
(1  ) 1 + p
s+t
l   ps+tf   g1
2
#
: (4)
7 In order to keep things simple we assume that the fact that the code is open has not brought any additional
competition to the OS rm for the good t. A possible way to account for the potential competition is to introduce
limit pricing. If we assume that ept
f 0 > 0 is the price at which a rm f 0 located at 1 enters the t market, then
the rm f must charge a price P tf  eP tf 0 to avoid entry.
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The expressions in square brackets in (3) and (4) are the usual demands functions obtained
by assuming that the market is covered and locating the consumer who is indi¤erent between
buying from the leader or the follower. These demands are expressed in terms of the post-
innovation gap g1 = s1l   s1f :
Computing the reaction functions and solving the system we get the following equilibrium
prices for the two PS rms case:
bpsl = bps+tl = 1 + g13 ; bpsf = bps+tf = 1  g13 :
The prices of the basic software s and of the bundle s+t are the same since the complement
good t does not bring any extra product di¤erentiation and is produced at zero marginal cost.
We could think that in this market s+t bundles are sold to everyone and some users just do not
use the t tools. A positive level of post-innovation gap g1 (the leader provides a higher gross
utility) implies that the leader is able to charge a higher price than the follower. Substituting
the equilibrium prices in the revenue function we obtain, for g1  3
psl = 
 
1 + g13
2
2
+ (1  )
 
1 + g13
2
2
=
1
2

1 +
g1
3
2
: (5)
psf = 
 
1  g13
2
2
+ (1  )
 
1  g13
2
2
=
1
2

1  g1
3
2
: (6)
Revenues are increasing in g1 for the leader and decreasing for the follower.
For g1 > 3 the follower exists and the leader becomes a constrained monopolist for both
the s and the s+ t markets. In this case the Nash equilibrium prices are
bpsf = bps+tf = 0; bpsl = bps+tl = g1   1:
Notice that the equilibrium requires that the leader serves all the market. With these prices
the leader obtains the following revenue
cml = g1   1: (7)
3.1.2 Mixed duopoly
When the leader is PS and the follower is OS, rms face the following maximization problems:
max
psl ;p
s+t
l
l = p
s
l


1  psl + g1
2

+ ps+t
l
"
(1  ) 1 + p
s+t
f   ps+tl + g1
2
#
; (8)
max
ps+tf
f = p
s+t
f
"
(1  ) 1 + p
s+t
l   ps+tf   g1
2
#
: (9)
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Notice that the revenue functions in (8) and (9) are the same as (3) and (4) in the PS
duopoly but assuming that psf = 0: The fact that the rival can not charge a positive price
for the basic software s has reduced the leaders demand for any psl . Computing the reaction
functions and solving the system we get the following equilibrium prices for the mixed duopoly
case:
bpsl = 12 + g12 ; bps+tl = 1 + g13 ; bptf = 1  g13 :
The leader no longer charges the same price for the software s and the bundle s+ t: since
prices are strategic complements and psf = 0, it charges a lower price for the basic software.
Substituting the equilibrium prices in the revenue function we obtain
mixl = 
 
1
2 +
g1
2
2
2
+ (1  )
 
1 + g13
2
2
; (10)
mixf = (1  )
 
1  g13
2
2
: (11)
Not only the followers revenue has decreased but also the leaders revenue from the smarket
is smaller. However the revenue di¤erence with the two PS case decreases as g1 approaches
to 3: Therefore an OS follower is particularly harmful for industry revenue when the post-
innovation gap is small (when qualities o¤ered by both rms are similar). Notice also that
the fact that the follower is OS has not a¤ected the revenue coming from the s+ t market for
both rms.
Like in the two PS case the equilibrium prices are valid as long as g1  3: For g1 > 3 the
follower exists and the leader becomes a constrained monopolist for both the s and the s + t
markets. The Nash equilibrium prices are
bpsf = bps+tf = 0; bpsl = bps+tl = g1   1:
and the leader obtains the following revenue
cml = g1   1:
3.2 Stage one: Innovation
At stage one, rms invest to increase the gross utility users derive when buying each software.
Given that s1i = s
0
i + Ii for i = fl; fg then the post innovation gap is
g1 = s
0
l + Il   s0f   If ;
= g0 + Il   If :
9
Since I assume a Stackelberg framework to solve the model we rst compute the followers
reaction function and then solve the leaders level of investment.
3.2.1 PS duopoly
When the PS follower chooses his level of investment, the leader has already decided on Il:
From (6) and (1) the PS follower chooses If to maximize prot
max
If
f =
8>><>>:
1
2

1  g0+Il If3
2
  (If )22 if g0 + Il   3  If ;
  (If )22 if g0 + Il   3 > If :
(12)
Solving (12) we derive the reaction function of the PS follower for a given g0 and Il:
Rps(g0 + Il) =
8><>:
3
8   18 (g0 + Il) if g0 + Il  3;
0 if g0 + Il > 3:
(13)
The followers innovation investment is decreasing both in the pre-innovation technological
gap g0 = s0l   s0f and in the rivals investment level Il ( If and Il are strategic substitutes).
We can see from (12) that both a higher g0 (initial technological disadvantage) and a higher
Il decrease the marginal revenue from innovation.
If g0 + Il > 3 the PS follower nds investment non protable so Rps = 0. Since g1 =
g0 + Il > 3 the rm will have no demand in stage two so it exits the market and the leader
becomes a constrained monopolist.
Given the reaction function (13), the leader chooses its investment level by maximizing
prots. The prot function depends on whether the leader is a constrained monopolist or not.
The leader becomes a constrained monopolist if Il > 3  g0. From (5), (7) and (1) the leaders
problem is given by:
max
Il
l =
8>><>>:
1
2

1 + g0+Il R
ps
3
2
  (Il)22 if Il  3  g0;
g0 + Il   1  (Il)
2
2 if Il > 3  g0:
(14)
Solving (14) we nd the leaders optimal level of investment when both rms are PS,bIpsl (g0), which is a function of the initial technological gap g0
bIpsl (g0) =
8><>:
9
55g0 +
21
55 if g0  g0;
1 if g0 > g0:
(15)
where
10
g0 = 2:1297:
The value g0 is the threshold point at which the leader decides to become a constrained
monopolist. It is obtained by equalizing the leaders maximum prot as a duopolist with the
prot as a constrained monopolist subject to the restriction that Il > 3  g0:
The leader investment is increasing in the pre-innovation gap, since a higher g0 increases the
marginal revenue of innovation. At g0 the investment function bIpsl (g0) presents a discontinuity
since bIpsl "jumps" from 0:73 to 1 to induce the followers exit from the market.
Substituting bIpsl into the reaction function of the follower (13), we obtain the followers
equilibrium investment when both rms are PS, bIpsf (g0):
bIpsf (g0) =
8><>:
18
55   855g0 if g0  g0;
0 if g0 > g0:
Notice that g1 = 7255g0 +
3
55 > g0; so the gap increases after the innovation period and the
di¤erence g1   g0 increases with g0: the leader has a stronger incentive to innovate than the
follower and this incentive is increasing in g0. This nding is in line with Sorenson (1995) who
uses an horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly à la hotelling to examine the persistence of market
leadership in a duopoly. Sorenson (1995) assumes, however, a Cournot game in the innovation
stage. Here the fact that the leader is rst mover only increases the di¤erence g1 g0 compared
to a Cournot game.
Although bIpsf is decreasing in g0 and bIpsl is increasing in g0, we have that total investment
in innovation bIps = bIpsf + bIpsl = 155g0 + 3955 : (16)
increases with g0:
The following proposition summarizes the results so far
Proposition 1 The PS leader invests more than the PS follower which increases the tech-
nological gap between rms (Sorenson 1995). There is a threshold value of pre-innovation
technological gap g0 such that for g0 > g0 the leader induces the exit of the follower. Total
innovation investment, bIps, is an increasing function of g0:
3.2.2 Mixed duopoly
The OS follower chooses its investment level by maximizing prots for a given level of g0, Il
and help IH : From (11) and (2) the OS follower problem is
11
max
If
f =
8>><>>:
(1  )

1  g0+Il If3
2
2   (If IH)
2
2 if g0 + Il   3  If ;
  (If IH)22 if g0 + Il   3 > If :
(17)
Solving (17) we can derive the reaction function:
Rmix(g0 + Il) =
8><>:
9IH 3+3
+8   1 +8 (g0 + Il) if g0 + Il  3 + IH ;
IH if g0 + Il > 3 + IH :
(18)
The followers innovation investment is increasing in the help provided by the community
and decreasing both in the pre-innovation technological gap g0and in the leader investment
level Il ( If and Il are strategic substitutes).
At g0 + Il = 3 + IH the OS follower nds investing non protable and abandons software
development, leaving the leader as a constrained monopolist. Notice that the OS follower exits
the market for a larger value of g0+ Il compared to the PS follower. As I mentioned in section
(2) the minimum level of investment for the OS project is IH since I assume that even if the
OS follower exits the market the OS community still invests IH to develop the software for
their own use.
Comparing the reaction functions in a mixed duopoly and in a PS duopoly we obtain the
following proposition
Proposition 2 If the help provided by the user-developers, IH ; is higher than a positive thresh-
old IH , then the level of investment of a PS follower is smaller that the level of investment of
a OS follower for all positive values of pre-innovation technological gap g0 and leaders invest-
ment Il such that the rm is present in the market: If the help, IH ; is lower than a threshold
IH ; then for small values of g0+ Il; the PS follower invests more than the OS follower and for
large values of g0 + Il the opposite is true.
Proof. see Appendix
Two opposing e¤ects generate this result. First compared to the PS rm, the OS follower
has no income on the s market. This means that for the same (g0 + Il), the OS rm has a lower
marginal revenue from innovation, which reduces the incentive to invest in innovation. Second,
the help from the community reduces the marginal cost of innovation for the OS follower which
increases the incentive to invest in innovation. If the help provided by the community is not
too large (i.e.: IH  IH = 38), the rst negative e¤ect prevails for small values of (g0 + Il).
Since income from the s market is decreasing in (g0 + Il), the rst e¤ect fades away so the
second e¤ect prevails for higher values of (g0 + Il).
Figure 1 illustrates proposition 2 for  = 12 :The three curves represent the followers reaction
functions: the solid line corresponds to a PS follower, the dashed line corresponds to an
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OS follower with IH = 14 > IH and the dotted line corresponds to an OS follower with
IH =
1
10 < IH : In the latter case we can see that for low values of g0 + Il the PS follower
invests more than a OS follower.
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Figure 1: Followers reaction functions as OS and PS rm.
Given the reaction function (18), the leader computes its optimal level of innovation in-
vestment. The prot function depends on whether the leader is a constrained monopolist or
not. The leader becomes a constrained monopolist if Il > 3 + IH   g0. From (10), (7) and (1)
the leaders problem is given by:
max
Il
l =
8>>><>>>:


1
2+
g0+Il Rmix
2
2
2 +
(1 )

1+
g0+Il Rmix
3
2
2   (Il)
2
2 if Il  IH + 3  g0;
g0 + Il   IH   1  (Il)
2
2 if Il > IH + 3  g0:
(19)
Comparing the second expression of the leaders prots in (14) and in (19) we can see
that the assumption of a minimum level of investment for the OS project only reduces the
constrained monopolist prots by IH ; which in turn will a¤ect the threshold level of g0 where
the leader decides to become a constrained monopolist.
Solving (19) we nd the optimal level of investment of the leader
bImixl (g0) =
8><>:
45+36
42+19+220 (g0   IH) + 12
2 15+84
42+19+220 if g0  g0;
1 if g0 > g0:
(20)
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where
g0 = IH +
34   82 + 136 + + 804 880+602+163p
19+42+220
45 + 36
:
The value g0 is the threshold point at which the leader decides to become a constrained
monopolist. An interesting issue is whether the leader in a mixed duopoly is willing to induce
the exit of the follower for larger or smaller value of g0 as opposed to a PS duopoly. Comparing
g0 with the threshold value in a PS duopoly, g0; we have g0 < g0 only if
IH < IH = 2:1297 
34   82 + 136 + 804 880+602+163p
19+42+220
45 + 36
: (21)
and g0  g0 otherwise.
Since IH is increasing in ; a su¢ cient condition to have g0 > g0 for all  2 (0; 1) is that
IH > 0:1297. There are two opposing e¤ects for this result. On the one hand the leaders
income in the s market is smaller in a mixed duopoly. This makes the income of a constrained
monopolist more tempting so the leader should be willing to induce exit for a lower g0: On
the other hand, the help IH the follower obtains in the mixed duopoly implies that, in order
to become a constrained monopolist, the leader requires a higher investment e¤ort. Moreover
since I assume that the OS community invests IH even if the OS follower exits, the income of
the constrained monopolist is reduced8 . Then, because of IH the leader should be willing to
induce exit for a higher g0. Therefore if help is su¢ ciently small (i.e.: IH < 0:1297) the leader
in a mixed duopoly decides to become a constrained monopolist for lower g0:
The equilibrium investment of the leader is decreasing in the help provided by the OS
community to the follower. Then, for the equilibrium to make sense, I need to impose a
condition on IH : Since bImixl is increasing in g0 I assume IH is such that bImixl jg0=0  0 for all
 2 (0; 1) : A su¢ cient condition is that:
Condition 1 IH  1:
Substituting bImixl into the reaction function of the follower we obtain the equilibrium value
bImixf =
8><>:
42+28 32
42+19+220g0 +
(252 9)IH+72 72
42+19+220 if g0  g0;
IH if g0 > g0:
The equilibrium investment of the follower is such that all the help provided by the com-
munity is used since bImixf is higher than IH for all 0 < g0 < g0 and  2 (0; 1) :
8All the main results are not a¤ected by g0 7 g0: If we assume alternatively that if the OS follower exits
the market, all development of the project is abandoned.then the income of the constrained monopolist is not
reduced and we have g0 < g0 for all IH :
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The comparison of the leaders optimal level of investment with that obtained in a PS
duopoly yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the help provided by the user-developers, IH ; is higher than a positive thresh-
old IH , then the leaders investment in a PS duopoly is higher than in a mixed duopoly for
all positive values of pre-innovation technological gap g0 2 [0; g0]. If help is lower than the
threshold IH then the leaders investment in a PS duopoly is higher than in a mixed duopoly
for low values of g0 while the opposite is true for large values of g0:
Proof. see Appendix
Three e¤ects generate this behavior. First when the follower is open source the leaders
income from the s market is reduced which lowers its incentive to invest. This e¤ect fades away
as g0 approaches to the threshold value where the leader becomes a constrained monopolist.
Second, Proposition 2 tells us that the OS follower invests more than a PS follower for large
values of g0 which in turn reduces the leader incentive to invest since If and Il are strategic
substitutes. This e¤ect increases with the community help IH provided to the follower. Finally,
the followers price in the s market is xed at zero and does not react to changes in the leaders
investment, which increases the marginal revenue from innovation for the leader. This e¤ect
exists as long as the follower is present in the market. While the rst and second e¤ects,
both reduce the incentive to invest of the leader in mixed duopoly, the third one increases this
incentive. When the help provided to the follower is su¢ ciently high IH > IH the rst and
second e¤ect o¤sets the third one for all positive values of g0; otherwise there is a range of g0
in which leaders investment in a mixed duopoly is higher than in a PS duopoly.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 for  = 12 . Each of the three curves represent the leaders
investment as a function of the pre-innovation technological gap g0: the solid line corresponds
to the PS duopoly, the dashed line corresponds to the mixed duopoly with IH < IH and the
dotted line correspond to the mixed duopoly with IH > IH . The discontinuity of the solid line
represents the point g0 at which the investment of the leader in a pure PS duopoly "jumps"
to induce the followers exit. We can see that if IH < IH we have an interval [bg0; g0] where
the leaders investment in a mixed duopoly is higher than in a PS duopoly. This interval is
represented by the point where the dashed line crosses the solid line and the discontinuity
point the of the solid line. Notice that a higher IH moves the curve to the southeast reducing
the interval [bg0; g0]. For IH > IH this interval disappears.
Proposition 2 tells us that for large values of community help, the follower investment is
larger in a mixed duopoly compared to a PS duopoly. On the other hand, from proposition 3
we know that the opposite is true for the leaders investment. Therefore, the extra followers
investment might be compensated by a smaller leaders investment. Then, it is interesting to
analyze what happens to total investment in innovation in a mixed duopoly, bImix; compared
to a PS duopoly, bIps:
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Figure 2: Leaders inverstment for mixed and PS duopoly cases.
Proposition 4 If the help provided by the user-developers, IH ; is higher than a positive thresh-
old fIH , then a mixed duopoly generates higher investment than a PS duopoly for all positive
values of pre-innovation technological gap g0 2 [0; g0]. If help is lower than the threshold fIH
then a PS duopoly generates more investment for low values of g0 (i.e.:g0 ! 0) and a mixed
duopoly generates higher investment for large values of g0.
Proof. see Appendix
From Propositions 2 and 3 we know that there are several e¤ects at play. The interesting
thing to notice is that even if the help provided by the community is zero, for certain values of
g0 total investment in innovation is higher in a mixed duopoly. In this case prots are lower for
both rms but the fact that the followers price in the basic software market is xed increases
the leaders incentive to invest.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 4 for  = 12 . Each of the three curves represents total
investment as a function of the pre-innovation technological gap g0: the solid line corresponds
to the pure PS duopoly, the dotted line corresponds to the mixed duopoly with IH = 0 < fIH
and the dashed line correspond to the mixed duopoly with IH > fIH . We can see that if
IH < fIH for low values of g0 total investment in a PS duopoly is higher and for large values
of g0 total investment is higher in a mixed duopoly even at IH = 0. A higher IH moves the
curve for the mixed duopoly upward reducing the region where a PS duopoly generates more
investment.
The main idea of Proposition 4 is that a mixed duopoly conguration is better than a
PS duopoly in terms of investment in innovation if the help from the community is large or
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Figure 3: Total investment for the PS and mixed duopoly cases
if the technological gap between rms is large. If the government cares about investment in
innovation, then Proposition 4 seems to suggest that there is room for policy intervention.
In particular a policy that incentivize technological laggards that are PS to become OS (for
example a conditional transfer or a tax cut for OS rms) might increase innovation investment
in the market. However, as we will see in the extended setup, this kind of policy might have
the opposite e¤ect if they are not carefully designed to take into consideration the market
leaders investment behavior.
4 Extended Setup: PS duopoly with OS threat.
In this section we solve the extended setup. Compared to the basic setup, now in the rst
stage the PS follower after observing the leaders investment decision, rst decides whether to
remain PS or become OS and then chooses its level of investment If :
From the computations of the basic setup we have all the ingredients to solve the extended
game. In order to keep things simple and to reduce the number of cases to analyze I assume
that 0  g0 < g0. In other words I require g0 to be in a range where the leader in a pure PS
duopoly nds inducing the followers exit non protable.
Depending on the followers OS/PS choice in the rst stage the game continues according to
the PS duopoly or the mixed duopoly of the basic setup: the follower invests according to Rmix
or Rps and in the second stage rms receive revenues psf and 
ps
l or 
mix
f and 
mix
l . Therefore,
to decide between OS and PS the follower compares, for a given g0 + Il; the maximum prot
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functions

ps
f =
1
2

1  g0 + Il  R
ps
3
2
  (R
ps)
2
2
; (22)

mix
f = (1  )

1  g0+Il Rmix3
2
2
 
 
Rmix   IH
2
2
: (23)
These prots are equal when
(g0 + Il)

=
1
9

27   8IH (1  )  2
p
2IH (8 + )
r
1  
 + 8

: (24)
Therefore if (g0 + Il)  (g0 + Il) the follower prefers to remain PS, and if (g0 + Il) >
(g0 + Il)
 it becomes OS.
Now we turn to the leader who must decide on Il at the beginning of the game. The rm
knows that for g0 + Il  (g0 + Il) the follower remains PS, so using the leaders optimal
investment function (15) we know that
g0 + bIpsl (g0)  (g0 + Il) ;
g0 +
9
55
g0 +
21
55
 (g0 + Il) ;
g0  g0 :
where
g0 =
55
576

27   8IH (1  )  2
p
2IH (8 + )
r
1  
 + 8

  21
64
: (25)
The threshold value g0 is decreasing in the help provided by the community and increasing
in the relative size of the s + t market. In order to make the problem interesting I need g0
to be positive and smaller than the threshold value at which the leader decides to become a
constrained monopolist. Then, to have 0 < g0 < g0; I need to impose the following condition
Condition 2 15 840IH+3025I
2
H
15 840IH+3025I2H+23 328
<  <
 1760IH+495I2H+256
p
55IH
 1760IH+495I2H+256
p
55(IH 2)+3808 for all IH > 0:
As we shall see later in Figure 4, this condition holds for a large set of IH and :
If the value of g0 is larger than the threshold point g0 and if the the leader invests according
to 20 then the follower becomes OS. If this is the case the leaders prots jumps from 
ps
l jg0=g0
to 
mix
l jg0=g0 , where 
ps
l and 
mix
l are, respectively, the leaders maximum prot functions in
a PS and in a mixed duopoly. Under Conditions 1 and 2 we obtain the following proposition
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Proposition 5 If conditions 1 and 2 are veried then at the threshold level of pre-innovation
technological gap g0 the leaders maximum prots are higher in a PS duopoly than in a mixed
duopoly. Moreover there is an interval [g0 ; g

0 ] for which the leader nds protable to avoid
the PS follower to become OS by investing in such a way to maintain (g0 + Il) = (g0 + Il)
.
Figure 4 illustrates the rst part Proposition 5. The area between the dashed lines repre-
sents the set of parameters for which 
ps
l jg0=g0 > 
mix
l jg0=g0 : The area inside the solid lines
represents the combination of parameters dened by Conditions 1 and 2. For all the combina-
tions of  and IH that verify Conditions 1 and 2 we have that 
ps
l jg0=g0 > 
mix
l jg0=g0 :
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Figure 4: Prots and set of IH and  that veries condition 1 & 2
Since 
ps
l is strictly increasing in g0; the leaders optimal investment function for the
interval [g0 ; g

0 ] is
bIl = (g0 + Il)   g0:
The function bIl is such that the follower always observes (g0 + Il) = (g0 + Il) and therefore
it remains PS. Since (g0 + Il) is constant along the interval [g0 ; g

0 ]the leader gets a constant
income equal to
epsl jg0=g0 = 12

1 +
  38 + 98 (g0 + Il)
3
2
:
Then the maximum prot function for the interval [g0 ; g

0 ] is
19
el (g0) = epsl jg0=g0  
 
(g0 + Il)
   g0
2
2
: (26)
Notice that el is tangent to psl at g0 = g0 . Since epsl jg0=g0 is constant and the cost is
decreasing in g0, the maximum prot function el is concave in g0 and increasing at the tangent
point g0 = g0 : Moreover el attains its maximum at
g0 = (g0 + Il)
  g0 : (27)
where bIl = 0:
Figure 5 illustrates the situation. The three curves represent the leaders maximum prots:
the solid one corresponds to a PS duopoly (
ps
l ), the dotted one to a mixed duopoly (
mix
l )
and the dashed one (el) corresponds a situation where the leader sets Il such that (g0 + Il) =
(g0 + Il)

: The function el is concave and tangent to psl at g0 = eg:
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Figure 5: Prot functions
We still have to dene the upper limit g0 of the interval[g

0 ; g

0 ]. A natural candidate is
the value g0 at which el (g0) = mixl (g0) : This value, however, could imply bIl < 0: I consider
only non negative levels of investment therefore from (27), g0 is dened in the following way
g0 = min
g0
n
g0 = (g0 + Il)

;fl (g0) = mixl (g0)o : (28)
The leaders equilibrium investment for the interval 0  g0 < g0 is
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bIl =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
9
55g0 +
21
55 if g0  g0 ;
(g0 + Il)
   g0 if g0 < g0  g0 ;
45+36
42+19+220 (g0   IH) + 12
2 15+84
42+19+220 if g

0 < g0 < g0  g0;
1 if g0  g0 < g0  g0:
Since bIl is decreasing for g0 2 [g0 ; g0 ] and bIf is constant we have that
Proposition 6 The "threat" of OS switch from the follower softens competition between rms
in the interval [g0 ; g

0 ]. Total investment in innovation in this interval is decreasing in g0.
Moreover, total investment is lower compared to the PS and mixed duopoly cases from the basic
setup.
Proof. see Appendix
Considering what we have learned from propositions 4, 5 and 6 we can conclude that:
 If the past accumulated technological gap is small (g0 < g0) then we should expect a PS
duopoly conguration. The PS rms may invest more or less than in a mixed duopoly
depending on the level of g0 and IH (Proposition 4). In particular, if IH is small then it
is more likely that the PS duopoly generates more invest than a mixed duopoly.
 If the accumulated technological gap is big (g0 > g0 ) then we should expect the laggard
to switch to OS and rms investing more than a PS duopoly (Proposition 4 and 5).
 If accumulated technological gap is intermediate, (g0 2 [g0 ; g0 ]) then we should expect
a PS duopoly conguration with rms doing low investment.(Proposition 5 and 6)
Although the OS switch can trigger high investment and lower prices, the threat of OS
switch can trigger the opposite. As I have already discussed at the end of section 3 in the
context of the basic setup, Proposition 4 suggests that a policy that incentivize technological
laggards that are PS to become OS might increase innovation investment in the market. How-
ever from Proposition 5 we learn that we should take into consideration the incentives of the
technological leader.
Consider, in this simplied setting, the e¤ect of a subsidy consisting in a xed transfer t to
the OS rm (we could think alternatively on a tax cut). This transfer reduces both the lower
and the upper limits of the interval [g0 ; g

0 ] : Therefore the success of the policy depends on
the initial level of g0. If g0 is such that with the policy we end up in the interval [g0 ; g

0 ] then
the result is that there is no switch at all and less innovation. Therefore a policy to support
OS could end up being potentially harmful to innovation.
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According to our very stylized model, in order to be successful the transfer should take
into consideration the incentive of the market leader to avoid the OS switch of the follower.
Our framework suggests that instead of being a xed amount, it should depend negatively on
g0 and IH ; and positively on : However it is very unlikely that the policymaker has accurate
information on these variables.
A example should help us clarify these results.
Example 1 Assume that  = 15 ; and IH =
1
5 : From (24) we compute the level of (g0 + Il) at
which mixf = 
ps
f
(g0 + Il)

= 1:484:
Using (25) we computes the threshold value
g0 = 0:947:
If g0 > g0 and if the leader invest according to (15), the follower becomes OS. If this is the
case the leaders prots jumps from l = 0:88 to l = 0:72: To avoid this the leader sets Il
such that bIl = 1:484  g0:
According to (28) the upper limit g0 of the interval where the leader avoids the OS switch is
given by:
g0 = min
g0
n
(g0 + Il)
   g0 = 0;fl (g0) mixl (g0) = 0o ;
= min
g0
f1:484; 1:481g = 1:481:
The equilibrium investment Il would then be
bIl =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
9
55g0 +
21
55 if g0  0:947 ;
1:484  g0 if 0:947 < g0  1:481;
0:201g0 + 0:323 if 1:481 < g0  2:2:
Figure 6 depicts total investment as a function of g0: For values of g0 2 [0; 0:947] we have a
PS duopoly without OS threat. For values g0 2 [0:947 16; 1:4815) we still have a PS duopoly
but the leader invests in such a way to avoid the followers OS switch. Along the interval
total investment is decreasing in g0: Finally for g0 2 [1:481; 2:2] the leader nds avoiding
the OS switch to costly so we have a mixed duopoly and total investment jumps and becomes
increasing again with respect to g0: The investment in a mixed duopoly is also depicted for
g0 2 [0; 1:481] with a dashed line. This shows that for all g0 there is clear gain in terms of
innovation investment if the PS follower can be induced to become OS. Lets now assume that
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Figure 6: Total investment under OS "threat".
the government announces, at the beginning of the game, a transfer t = 0:01 to OS rms.
Then the new level of (g0 + Il) at which mixf = 
ps
f is:
(g0 + Il)

t = 1:115 < 1:484:
and the threshold value g0 is
g0 = 0:630 < 0:947:
To avoid the follower becoming OS the leader sets Il such that
bIl = 1:115  g0:
The upper limit g0 of the interval where the leader avoids the OS switch is given by:
g0 = min
g0
f1:115; 1:16g ;
= 1:115:
As we can see, only if g0 2 (1:115; 1:481) this transfer will induce the PS follower to become OS.
If g0  1:481 the PS follower will become OS anyway so the transfer is useless. If g0  1:115
this policy does not induce the OS switch. Moreover if g0 2 [0:630; 1:115] the transfer reduces
investment in innovation.
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5 Relation to the literature
In this paper I presented an horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly framework, that links compe-
tition, incentives to innovate, exit and decisions of software rms to become OS.
Two papers are closely related to my framework: Sorenson (1995) and Schmidt and
Schnitzer (2003). Sorenson (1995) uses an horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly à la Hotelling to
examine the persistence of market leadership in a duopoly. As in my model rms rst invest
in product-improving R&D prior to competing in prices and they di¤er in their initial level
of product quality. He nds that the leader in a horizontally di¤erentiated market always
becomes increasingly dominant. His framework is similar to my PS duopoly case in the Basic
Setup, with the exception that he assumes a Cournot game in the rst stage and each rms
sells only one good. My paper adapts his framework to account for the specicities of an OS
rm. The OS rm generates no revenue from the basic software but has a positive income from
selling a complementary good and it also receives free help from a community of developers
which lowers the rms innovation costs. Another di¤erence is that I add an intermediate step
in the game to allow the follower to choose between remaining PS or becoming OS. As in
Sorenson (1995), in my Basic Setup the technological leader always becomes increasingly dom-
inant however in the Extended setup this is no longer true: the PS leader may invest in such a
way that the post-innovation technological gap is lower than the pre-innovation technological
gap, in order to avoid the OS switch of the PS follower.
Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) build a model to study the e¤ect of government forcing some
agencies to adopt OS and the e¤ect this adoption has on welfare and incentives to improve
quality on a PS developer. They assume that there are two software alternatives in the market,
one PS and the other OS. Each rm is located at one extreme of the hotelling line. The PS
software there is sold by a prot maximizing rm that sets the price and invest in software
quality. In contrast, the OS software price is set at 0 and there is no investment in quality.
Consumers are divided in three categories. The rst group always buy the PS software, the
second one always buy the OS software and the third group may buy either of the two.
They model the preferences of the third group with a Hotelling model of horizontal product
di¤erentiation. They nd that if the government reduces the amount of consumers of the
third group to increase the number of the second group, this reduces welfare and investment
incentives of the PS rm. The are two main di¤erences with my model. First I assume a for
prot rm behind the OS software that receives revenue from selling a complement good and
invests in product quality improvement. Second I endogenize the decision of becoming OS.
This two di¤erences have an important a¤ect on the incentives to invest of the PS rm.
Comino and Manetti (2005) also use a Hotelling model to analyze the impact on welfare of
government policies supporting open source software. They assume that there are two software
alternatives in the market, one PS and one OS. The PS rm chooses the price while OS software
is free. Consumers are divided between those who are informed about the existence of the OS
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software and those who are not. Under this assumption some uninformed consumers, who
are far from the PS rm may remain "inactive" by not using any software. Contrary to
Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) they nd that mandated adoption may increase social welfare
since it forces some "inactive" consumers to use OS software and therefore enjoy a positive
benet. They also nd that a policy that informs uninformed users about the existence of the
OS alternative also increases welfare. On the other hand a subsidy for consumers to use OS
software always reduces welfare.
Gaudeul (2008) also analyzes the e¤ects of competition between OS and PS software but
in the context of a Vickrey-Salop model of spatial product di¤erentiation. The author shows
that a mixed industry with OS and PS projects may exhibit large OS projects cohabiting with
more specialized PS projects and this congurations is better in terms of welfare compared to
a industry with only PS rms.
Besides Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003), the issue of innovation investment in the context of
OS has been studied in several papers.
Economides and Katsamakas (2005) build a model to compare investment incentives of
platform and application developers when the platform can be OS or PS. The application
developers and the PS platform decide their level of investment as prot maximizing rms
while the OS platform investment depends user-developers that maximize the sum of consumer
surplus and a reputation value. They nd that the level of investment in applications is larger
when the operating system is open source. The comparison for platforms depends, among
others, on reputation e¤ects and the number of developers.
Bitzer and Schröder (2005) study the e¤ect on innovation of OS entry by comparing in-
novation incentives in a software Monopoly vs a software duopoly. Rather that competing in
price or quantities, software producers compete in technology levels. They assume that the OS
producer is a reputation maximizing agent, where reputation is a xed monetary reward times
the demand for the software. Compared to a PS rm the OS rm also has lower innovation
costs. The authors nd that entry of a low-cost OS producer increases the technology set
of the for prot rm beyond the level that would have resulted from a for prot entry with
higher costs. This result is similar to what I nd in my framework where a mixed duopoly
may generate more innovation than a PS duopoly. However the reasons for each result are
di¤erent. While in my framework the key ingredient is that OS followers price in the basic
software market is xed at zero, in Bitzer and Schröder (2005) is that the technology levels
are strategic complements.
Verani (2006) presents a di¤erentiated duopoly model to study investment software quality
under a Proprietary or Open Source regime. Firms rst invest in quality and then x prices.
Under a PS regime the quality achieved by each rm depends only on their own investment
while under an OS regime there are spillover e¤ects. The author nds that investment is in-
creasing in the spillover rate when the goods are substitutes and independent but is decreasing
in when the goods are close to perfect complements.
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Darmon et. al. (2007) study the di¤usion of both PS and OS software with a two-step
game model where rst the PS rm chooses price and quality and then users decide whether
to use a PS software, OS software or neither. The authors nd a winner-takes-all competition
may arise between types of software, which may lead to the exit of one of them.
The trade o¤ that a for prot rm faces to become OS or to release his code as OS has
been analyzed before in the literature.
Lerner and Tirole (2004) suggest that behind the rms code donation there is a strategy
of "giving away the razor (the released code) to sell more razor blades" (complement goods
and services). They also suggest that "the temptation to go open source is particularly strong
when the product is lagging behind the leader and making few prots". In contrast Commino
and Manetti (2007) assume that by releasing the code the rm obtains the collaboration of
developers which increases the software quality. Baake and Wichmann (2004) suggest that
the OS code releasing reduces the rm developing cost but also reduces the reservation price
consumers are willing to pay for the commercial version. Similar to Lambardi (2008) the trade
o¤ in this paper is: less income on the software market in exchange of less development or
innovation costs.
6 Conclusions
Open source has become a widespread phenomena in the software industry. While some
open source projects are born as new alternatives to existing proprietary software some others
originate from failed proprietary software experiences. Successful OS projects such as the
Eclipse example analyzed here show that OS may be a viable outside option for those PS
software that failed to retain market share against a competitor. Donald K. Rosenberg, author
of Open Source: The Unauthorized White Papers, summarizes the later situation as follows:
"The software world is lled with the casualties of Microsoft competition. The return of Open
Source provides an opportunity for those of them still able to lift a hand".
It is also clear form the Eclipse example that the market leader can su¤er signicantly
when the follower becomes OS so it might be protable to avoid this switch. The SAP example
shows us that market leaders have learn to take into consideration the followers temptations
to become OS.
In this paper I to study how the behavior of the leader is a¤ected by the fact that the
follower is, or might become, OS. In particular I analyze how innovation investment in a
software duopoly is a¤ected by this OS switch.
I presented an horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly setup, that links competition, incentives
to innovate, exit and decisions of software rms to become OS. Although the model is very
stylized I believe it gives some interesting insight and sheds some light on the OS phenomena.
First I show that if the initial technological gap between rms is small, a duopoly with two PS
rms might generate more innovation than a mixed duopoly of an PS and OS rm. However if
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the initial technological gap is big then a duopoly with two PS rms generates less innovation
than a mixed duopoly. Second, in a context of a duopoly with two PS rms, the outside option
for the technological laggard to become OS can soften competition on innovation. In fact I show
that if the technological gap falls into a certain "intermediate" region (not too low or large)
total investment in innovation could be substantially low, due to the fact that the technological
leader may prefer to reduce his innovation investment in order to avoid the temptation of the
follower to become Open Source. Since mixed duopoly can generate more innovation than a
PS duopoly I analyzed the possibility of introducing a subsidy (xed transfer) to incentivize
technological laggards that are PS to become OS. Our framework suggests, however; that such
policy could end up being potentially harmful to innovation.
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6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We will compare the reaction functions of the follower as a PS rm, denoted Rps (g0 + Il) ;and
as an OS rm, Rmix (g0 + Il). If g0 + Il < 3 the PS follower will be present in the s market,
so the di¤erence between the reaction functions is given by:
Rps  Rmix = 3
8
  1
8
(g0 + Il)
 

(9IH   3 + 3)
 + 8
  1  
 + 8
(g0 + Il)

rearranging terms we get
Rps  Rmix =  9
8

 + 8
(g0 + Il) +
9 (3   8IH)
8 ( + 8)
Since (g0 + Il) > 0; the rst term is always negative for all values of  2 (0; 1) : The second
term can be positive or negative. A su¢ cient condition for the second term to be non positive
is:
IH  IH = 3
8

Then if IH  IH ; we have that Rps < Rmix for all values of 0  (g0 + Il) < 3. On the other
hand if 0 < IH < IH the second term is positive and for values of (g0 + Il) ! 0 it exceeds
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the rst term, therefore we have Rps > Rmix. As (g0 + Il) increases the rst negative term
exceeds the second one so we have that Rps < Rmix. In particular it is always the case that
when (g0 + Il)! 3 we have that
Rps  Rmix =  9 IH
 + 8
which is always negative for IH > 0 and  2 (0; 1) :
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We will compare the leaders equilibrium investment in a PS duopoly, bIpsl ; and in a mixed
duopoly, bImixl . From (15) and (20) we know that the expression to be compared are:
bIpsl = 955g0 + 2155 if g0 < g0
bImixl = 45+3642+19+220 (g0   IH) + 122 15+8442+19+220 if g0 < g0
Notice that the threshold values g0 and g0 at which the leader decides to become a con-
strained monopolist are di¤erent. Therefore the interval values of g0 for which the comparison
between the PS and mixed duopoly is valid depends on g0 7 g0: We know from (21) that if
IH > IH = 2:1297 
34   82 + 136 + 804 880+602+163p
19+42+220
45 + 36
then g0 < g0 and g0 > g0 otherwise.
The di¤erence between bIpsl and bImixl is given by
bIpsl   bImixl =  955   45 + 3642 + 19 + 220

g0
+

21
55
  12
2   15 + 84
42 + 19 + 220

+ IH
45 + 36
42 + 19 + 220
For all  2 (0; 1) the rst term is negative and the second and third are always positive
(given g0  0 and IH > 0). For low values of g0 ! 0 the expression is positive implyingbIpsl > bImixl . As g0 grows the expression becomes smaller. A su¢ cient condition for the
expression to become negative is that at the end of the interval is negative. Therefore
 If IH > IH then g0 < g0 so the su¢ cient condition for the expression to become negative
for g0 2 [0; g0] is that
IH < IH =
256   42
275 + 220

34
9
  2
9
p
55

  136   64
2
275 + 220
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 If IH < IH then g0 > g0 so the su¢ cient condition for the expression to become negative
for g0 2

0; g0

is that
IH < IbH =
 
 8
9

 
22   130 + 128
5 + 4
!r
1
42 + 19 + 220
+
8
9
 ( + 17)
5 + 4
Notice that IbH > IH > IH for all  2 (0; 1). From the analysis of both cases (i.e.: IH < IH
and IH > IH ) we conclude that:
 We always have that for values of g0 ! 0, bIpsl > bImixl
 If IH < IH we always have that for g0 ! g0; bIpsl < bImixl .
 If IH < IH < IH we always have that for g0 ! g0; bIpsl < bImixl .
 If IH = IH ; then bIpsl > bImixl except at g0 where bIpsl = bImixl
 If IH > I and since IH > IH then bIpsl > bImixl for all g0 2 [0; g0]
Given IH < IH ; we can dene bg0 as the level of g0 such that bIpsl   bImixl = 0: The value bg0
is given by
bg0 = 275 + 220
256   42 IH +
16   34
   64
and bg0 < g0 if IH < IH < IH and bg0 < g0 if IH < IH
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We are will compare the sum of the equilibrium investments of the leader and the follower in
a PS duopoly, bIps; and in a mixed duopoly, bImix.
bIps = 1
55g0 +
39
55 if g0 < g0
bImix = 42+73+4
42+19+220g0 +
216 54
42+19+220IH +
122 87+156
42+19+220 if g0 < g0
The interval values of g0 for which the comparison between the PS and mixed duopoly is
valid depends on g0 7 g0: We know form the proof of proposition 3 that if IH > IH then
g0 > g0 and if IH < IH then g0 < g0:
The di¤erence between bImix and bIps is given by
bImix   bIps =  42 + 73 + 4
42 + 19 + 220
  1
55

g0 +

216  54
42 + 19 + 220

IH (29)
+

122   87 + 156
42 + 19 + 220
  39
55

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For all  2 (0; 1) and for positives values of IH and g0 the rst and second terms are
positive and the third one is negative.
 If IH > IH then g0 < g0 and for high values of g0 (i.e. g0 ! g0) the expression (29) is
positive for all  2 (0; 1) even at IH = IH .
 If IH < IH then g0 > g0 and for high values of g0 (i.e. g0 ! g0) the expression (29) is
positive for all  2 (0; 1) even at IH = 0.
Then, in both cases, a su¢ cient condition for (29) to become negative is that at least at
g0 = 0 it is negative. This happens if
IH < fIH = 307   282
660  165
So provided IH < fIH (i.e.: the help is not very large) for low values g0 we have that bIps >bImix and for high values of g0 we have that bImix > bIps: On the other hand if IH > fIH and
since fIH > IH for all  2 (0; 1) then bImix > bIps for all g0 2 [0; g0] :
Given IH < fIH ; we can dene bbg0 as the level of g0 such that bIps   bImix = 0: The value bbg0
is given by
bbg0 = 307   660IH   282 + 165IH222 + 122
and bbg0 < g0 if IH < IH < fIH and bbg0 < g0 if IH < IH
6.4 Proof of Proposition 6
We going to show that total investment in innovation in the interval (g0 ; g

0 ] is lower compared
to the PS and mixed duopoly cases. From equation (16) we know that total investment in
innovation bIps from the basic setup is increasing in g. In the extended setup total investment
for the interval (g0 ; g

0 ] is
bIpse = 3
8
+
7
8
(g0 + Il)
   g0
which is decreasing in g0 for a given (g0 + Il)

: Since bIps = bIpse at g0 = g0 ; then bIps > bIpse
for the interval (g0 ; g

0 ] :
From the proof of Proposition 4 we know that if g0 > bbg0 then bImix > bIps: Since bbg0 < g0
for all IH > 0 and  2 (0; 1) then we have that bImix > bIpsfor (g0 ; g0 ]. We have shown above
that for this interval bIps > bIpse then bImix > bIpse:
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